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THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT 
AND THE RULE OF LAW* 
Frank E. Cooperf 
FOR a long time, people have been talking about the executive department of government and the Rule of Law. Indeed, the 
suggestion of Aristotle that government should be by law, and not 
by men, represented a protest directed to the earlier Grecian sys-
tems of despotically controlled administrative law.1 It is my 
privilege this afternoon to carry fonvard the discussion of a prob-
lem that has been talked about for some two thousand years: how 
to apply the Rule of Law to the executive agencies of the govern-
ment. They are commonly called "independent agencies" within 
the executive branch. I suggest that the name is well chosen, for 
they have assumed a degree of independence that puts them be-
yond the effective control of the legislatures and the courts. This, 
I make bold to suggest, should not be so, if we are to preserve the 
Rule of Law to which as lawyers we have all dedicated our lives; 
for the very concept of the Rule of Law "means in the last resort 
the right of the judges to control the executive government .... " 
These are the words of the venerable A. V. Dicey, barrister-at-law 
of the Inner Temple and Vinerian Professor at Oxford. He wrote 
them seventy-four years ago.2 
Now, it has become commonplace to treat Mr. Dicey with a 
sort of polite condescension. But as I re-read his famous book a 
few weeks ago, I was impressed with the thought that his ideas are 
not so different from those expressed only a few months ago by a 
hard-headed and practical American lawyer, Mr. Louis J. Hector, 
in his famous Memorandum to the President, written upon the 
occasion of his resigning from the Civil Aeronautics Board. 
This recent reiteration of Mr. Dicey's ideas suggests that it is 
relevant to re-examine what Mr. Dicey had to say; and then con-
sider whether his suggestions are pertinent to our contemporary 
post-war thinking about the rule of law. He declared: "In Eng-
• Lecture delivered on June 23, 1960, as part of a series of lectures on the general topic, 
"Post-'War Thinking About the Rule of Law," given in connection with the Special 
Summer School for Lawyers held at The University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor. 
June 20-July I, 1960.-Ed. 
t Of the Detroit Bar; Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1 The classic phrase found in Part I, § 30, of the Massachusetts Constitution, 1780, was 
borrowed from Harrington [OCEANA 2-29 (1656)] who acknowledged his indebtedness to 
Aristotle's PoLmcs III, xvi, 4-5. 
2 DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CoNsrrrunON 401 (2d ed. 1886). 
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land, and in ... the United States ... the system of administrative 
law and the very principles on which it rests are in truth un-
known."3 This is so, he added, because the system of administra-
tive law4 "rests upon political principles at variance with the ideas 
which are embodied in our existing constitution, and contradicts 
modern English convictions as to the rightful supremacy or rule 
of the law of the land.''5 
Some years later, reviewing in the Law Quarterly Review the 
now famous decision in Local Government Board v. Arlidge, [1915] 
A.C. 120, which permitted a municipal council to order a rooming 
house closed after an ex parte investigation and without notice or 
hearing, Mr. Dicey pointed out that this decision allowed executive 
agencies of government to exercise judicial authority not in ac-
cordance with the procedures of the courts of law, but rather in 
accordance with whatever procedures the agency found to be 
"convenient in the transaction of the business."6 
There can be no doubt but that Mr. Dicey was most accurate 
in his prediction that administrative agencies would, as they de-
veloped, operate not in accordance with traditional judicial modes, 
but rather in accordance with such procedures as they might find 
convenient. This thought was echoed and strongly emphasized 
a few years ago by the United States Supreme Court.7 
But was Mr. Dicey correct in his contention that this course of 
development would be in derogation of the Rule of Law? Was he 
a prophet without honor, or an old-fashioned viewer-with-alarm? 
For a long time I thought his views were outdated. But on re-
cently re-reading them, I was impressed with the close similarity 
between his views and those expressed last September by Mr. 
Hector in his Memorandum to the President. He said (p. 29) 
that the failure of the members of regulatory commissions to decide 
cases on the basis of personal knowledge of the record, and their 
failure to explain the reasons for their decisions, mean "that the 
3Id. at 182. 
4 Ibid. He was speaking particularly of the droit administratif of France; but his 
remarks can fairly be applied in a broader context. 
5Id. at 205. 
6 31 L.Q. REv. 149, 151 (1915). 
7 In FTC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 142 (1940), Mr. Justice Frank-
furter observed for the Court: "Modern administrative tribunals ••. have been a response 
to the felt need of governmental supervision over economic enterprise .••. Perhaps the 
most striking characteristic of this movement has been the investiture of administrative 
agencies with power far exceeding and different from the conventional judicial modes for 
adjusting conflicting claims ...• These differences in origin and function preclude whole-
sale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial, and review which have evolved from 
the history and experience of courts." 
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so-called 'quasi-judicial' processes of the agencies bear little rela-
tion to what is normally thought of as judicial process." 
More specifically, he asserted (p. 19) that the public "have the 
right to expect, as a part of the basic judicial process: 
"I. That adjudicated cases will be decided on the basis 
of general principles and standards known to the parties and 
applicable to all cases, and 
"2. That the persons who decide adjudicated cases will do 
so on the basis of the voluminous testimony and arguments 
advanced by the parties and this alone, and that they will per-
sonally state the reasons for their decision." 
But, Mr. Hector added, "Neither of these reasonable expecta-
tions is satisfied by present Board procedures and practices." 
We find, in short, that the English scholar ,vriting in 1886 and 
the hard-headed American lawyer ,vriting in 1959 reached the 
same conclusion, which might fairly be summarized with the blunt 
assertion that the conduct of administrative agencies is in deroga-
tion of the judicial process which we describe as the rule of law. 
So blunt is this assertion that I should like to buttress it by a 
number of examples illustrating the wide disparity between the 
administrative and the judicial process-disparities which indicate 
a well-defined tendency on the part of the agencies to depart from 
the norms that characterize our Anglo-American Rule of Law. Then 
I should like to suggest what I deem to be the principal reasons 
for this departure. Finally, I should like to review briefly the 
principal proposals now being urged in the hope of healing this 
rapidly developing breach between the executive agencies of the 
government and the Rule of Law-proposals to integrate the func-
tions of the administrative agencies with the judicial process. 
Examples of the Disparity 
Illustrations of the fundamental disparities between the ad-
ministrative and the judicial process fall into two principal cate-
gories: (a) differences in the attitude of the decision-maker; (b) 
differences in the process of reaching the decision. 
Judge v. Administrator-Eight Differences in Attitude 
I. Perhaps the outstanding illustration of the deep-seated 
differences in attitude between administrators and judges concerns 
their interest or disinterest in the result. In the Anglo-American 
legal system, judges are steeped in long-established traditions of 
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impartiality. A judge will frequently disqualify himself for the 
slightest reason that might conceivably affect the impartiality of his 
judgment. On the other hand, administrators, appointed to ad-
minister broad policies of social or economic reform, entertain so 
strong a predilection for rapid implementation of these policies, 
that they exhibit an active interest in the outcome of cases pending 
before them. Such interest, to be sure, is inherent in the purpose 
for which such agencies are created; and the absence of such in-
terest would interfere with their most effective functioning. But 
over-concern with the desirability of achieving appointed ends 
sometimes leads to an excess of zeal-as illustrated by the antipathy 
toward participation by counsel in agency proceedings, some-
times encountered, or a pronounced antagonism toward judicial 
review. 
2. A second outstanding characteristic of the administrative 
process is the broad scope of administrative discretion. Although 
courts characteristically eschew discretionary standards in deter-
mining legal rights, discretion is the very life-blood of administra-
tive adjudication. It can be granted that the vesting of discre-
tionary powers in administrative agencies is necessary to the most 
effective performance of their appointed tasks. But at the same 
time, it clearly appears that where agencies predicate their de-
cisions on such vague standards as what is deemed "adequate," 
"desirable," "detrimental" and the like, what might be called the 
rule of discretion is substituted for the Rule of Law. Discretion 
can be exercised more freely when cases are decided without a 
hearing; and the resulting tendency to minimize the importance of 
hearings has had far-reaching effects on the course of administra-
tive decision. Again, reliance on the role of discretion has disin-
clined many agencies to make available for the use of interested 
parties any clear statements either of the exact practice and pro-
cedure of the agency, or the criteria relied on by the agency in 
deciding cases. 
3. A third characteristic attitude of administrative agencies 
is to emphasize (if not magnify) their stature by seeking to extend 
their jurisdiction to the furthest possible limits. Not infrequently, 
they press further than the legislature intended. The courts have 
had occasion to strike down unwarranted assumptions of jurisdic-
tion by such agencies as the Federal Trade Commission,8 the 
BFTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349 (1941). 
1961] THE EXECUTIVE AND THE RULE OF LAW 519 
Interstate Commerce Commission,9 the Securities and Exchange 
Commission,10 the Federal Power Commission,11 and others. Some-
times it has been Congress rather than the courts which called a 
halt, as when the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of 
Labor determined that its jurisdiction over employees engaged 
in occupations necessary to the production of goods for commerce 
extended to the gardener who mowed the grass and trimmed the 
geraniums in a garden outside the executive offices of a company 
in whose plant goods were produced.12 
4. A fourth illustration of the expansive genius of administra-
tion may be seen in the cases where the courts have struck down 
administrative decisions on the ground that the administrators 
have adopted policies going beyond or even at variance with the 
standards of the statutes which the agencies administer. Thus, 
the Court has criticized the Federal Communications Commission 
for seeking to accomplish through agency regulations an amend-
ment in the governing statute which it had unsuccessfully re-
quested of Congress.13 The National Labor Relations Board has 
been reminded by the Supreme Court that a company "cannot be 
held guilty of an unfair labor practice by administrative amend-
ment of the statute.''14 Similarly, the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission has been reversed because it added a requirement not in-
cluded in or authorized by the statute, as a condition of acquiring 
a carrier Iicense.15 The Civil Aeronautics Board was criticized by 
the Court on the ground that it "forsook the standard" imposed 
by Congress "and adopted a different one."16 The Federal Trade 
Commission was found to have adopted policies at variance with 
those of the statute, when it asserted power to compel a seller of 
patent medicines to include in his advertisements statements that 
would be derogatory of the value of his product.17 The Supreme 
Court has more than once had occasion to condemn administrative 
determinations of the Internal Revenue Service as being invalid 
9 United States v. Pacific Coast ·wholesalers' Ass'n, 338 U.S. 689 (1950). 
10 Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936). 
11 FPC v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498 (1949). 
12 Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1949, 63 Stat. 911, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1958). 
13 FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954). 
14 Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, !138 U.S. 355, 364 (1949). 
15 Barrett Line v. United States, 326 U.S. 179 (1945). 
16 Civil Aeronautics Board v. Summerfield, 347 U.S. 67, 72 (1954). 
17 Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1950). 
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attempts to "add a supplementary legislative provision" to a 
statute.18 
5. A fifth characteristic attitude of agencies has to do with 
their evaluation of the evidence presented in contested cases. 
Their constant striving to reach desired results tends to make most 
administrators "convicting judges." The performance of most 
agencies in the appraisal of evidence leaves much to be desired, 
from the viewpoint of achieving a scrupulously impartial deter-
mination of facts. The reports contain a distressingly large num-
ber of cases wherein courts have felt compelled-despite the crutch 
afforded by the substantial evidence rule-to set aside agency find-
ings of facts as being based on mere conjecture and speculation.19 
6. The principle of stare decisis is little heeded in administra-
tive adjudication. Indeed, to the extent that the doctrine is 
founded on the notion that the law does not change-or that it 
changes slowly-the classical doctrine of stare decisis does not 
square with the theory and practice of the agencies. It is common-
place that today's ruling may be based on a different policy, or on 
a different principle or philosophy, than yesterday's ruling. This 
attitude of treating each decision as a unique phenomenon, un-
affected by precedent, sharply differentiates the administrative 
process from the judicial. 
7. The principle of res judicata is likewise inapplicable to 
administrative adjudication-and properly so, for agencies are not 
courts, and their determinations are not judgments. But it should 
be noted in passing that the freedom of agencies to disregard the 
philosophy on which the res judicata principle is based, leads to 
attitudes which are at odds with the traditional approach of the 
Rule of Law. 
8. The last of the eight attitudes I should like to mention is 
that which makes many agencies impatient to hear out the re-
spondent. It is only natural that an agency which acts as both 
prosecutor and judge, and which does not institute proceedings 
until its own informal investigation has convinced it preliminarily 
of respondent's guilt, should display a certain readiness to treat 
respondent's offers of proof in somewhat cavalier fashion. Seldom 
does this treatment go so far as the instance reported in Brinkley 
18 E.g., Helvering v. Credit Alliance Corp., 316 U.S. 107, 113 (1942): Helvering v. 
American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943). 
19 For cases, see Cooper, The "Substantial Evidence" Rule, 44 A.B.A.J. 945 (1958). 
1961] THE EXECUTIVE AND THE RULE OF LAW 521 
v. Hassig.20 There, in proceedings to revoke a physician's license, 
one of the members of the licensing board, after listening to re-
spondent's testimony for three days, said he was ready to vote-
against respondent-and asked permission to cast his vote and be 
excused for more pressing business. Most administrators are more 
sophisticated, but the attitude so forthrightly indicated by the very 
frank physician in the Kansas case twenty-five years ago has per-
sisted, and had been criticized by such diverse authorities as Presi-
dent Roosevelt and the Hoover Commission. It is an attitude 
which, along with the others, reveals a tendency at odds with 
the fundamental concepts of the Rule of Law. 
Courts v. Agencies -Differences in Procedure 
Differences in the process of decision-no less than differences 
in mental attitude-account for the tendency of administrators to 
depart from the norms that characterize the Rule of Law. We all 
know, as the Court recently reminded us in Speiser v. Randall,21 
that "the procedures by which the facts of the case are determined 
assume an importance fully as great as the validity of the sub-
stantive rule of law to be applied." 
We all know, too, the typical process of agency adjudication: 
The materia of decision [pleadings, a transcript of testimony, 
exhibits (frequently, thousands of pages of exhibits), a hearing 
examiner's report, proposed findings by each party (duly excepted 
to by the other party) and voluminous briefs] are all dumped into 
the files of the agency, like ingredients dumped into a metaphysical 
crucible or melting pot; and there a secret group of anonymous 
staff assistants blend them into a witches brew from which finally 
emerges a secret staff memo (in formulistic adherence to the re-
quirements of the Morgan case) that becomes transmuted into an 
agency decision. 
Long ago, the Supreme Court declared in Morgan v. United 
States22 that the agency members who decide the case must master 
the record. But this is an impossible command. There is recorded 
the instance of the member of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion who found that over a period of two years he cast a case-decid-
ing vote every twelve and one-half minutes of his working time.23 
20 83 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1936). 
21 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958). 
22 298 U.S. 468 (1936). 
23 DAVIS, CAsES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 423 (1951). 
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Commissioner Hector pointed out (p. 34) that members of the 
C.A.B. find "there is no real chance for a review of the record" 
and that "the thousands of man-hours which go into the making of 
a record are thus virtually ignored at the crucial moment of final 
decision." 
It is not the members of the agency who make the decision. 
The actual decision is hammered out by the unseen, unknown, 
unapproachable (we hope!) staff assistants-a group of lawyers, 
engineers, statisticians, technicians, and political hacks. They 
produce a staff "memo" which too frequently affords substantially 
the only source of information available to the agency members, 
when they decide the case. Deciding the case is sometimes made 
easier, to be sure, because the staff memo is frequently accompanied 
by a proposal for decision-a proposal which, judged by the sup-
porting memorandum-appears eminently reasonable. 
How well these staff memoranda are prepared no one can judge 
-for they are secret documents not made available to the parties 
to the case. The actual decision-making process within the 
agencies is one, as Donald C. Beelar so well put it, "about which 
we know almost as little as we know about the dark side of the 
moon."24 We do know that a great deal of internal maneuvering 
goes on. We do know that the maneuvering includes external 
influence and pressures, as individuals possessing an interest in 
the matter and some degree of influence approach the agency staff, 
much as lobbyists approach legislators. We do know that as of a 
few years ago in the National Labor Relations Board, for ex-
ample,25 a detailed review of the record in representation cases 
was made by only one person-one of the junior legal assistants to 
one of the members of the Board. We do know that the trial 
examiner's report and recommendation is frequently disregarded. 
We do know, to borrow again from Mr. Beelar, that all these 
internal maneuverings may have more to do with the actual de-
cision than anything in the hearing record. 
Can you imagine any procedure further removed from norms 
consonant with the Rule of Law? It is as if a trial judge, at the 
conclusion of a hearing, bundled up the record and briefs of the 
parties and turned them over to the law clerks of the judges sitting 
on the appellate court, and these law clerks prepared short memos 
24 Beelar, The Dark Phase of Agency Litigation, 12 Ad. L. Bull. 34 (1959). 
25 The Problem of Delay in Administering the Labor-Management Relations Act, Staff 
Report to the Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations of the Committee 
on Labor and Public Welfare, U.S. Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. ll-15 (1952). 
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-perhaps five or ten pages to a case-and the judges of the appellate 
court were asked to render initial decision on the basis of such 
memos (which the parties were not even permitted to see) at a 
rate approximating five decisions per houri 
Even this comparison is not complete, for it leaves out the 
element which is really critical in the administrative process of 
adjudication-the tugging and tussling within the agency staff, 
where in the war of competing philosophies and ideologies and-
frankly-political pressures, the testimony of the parties and the 
points argued in briefs of counsel and the recommendations of the 
trial examiner may be quite overlooked; where a litigant may be 
ambushed by secret lurking forces without his knowing what has 
happened. 
When the decision does finally emerge from all this maelstrom, 
it bears little resemblance to a court opinion. The latter is es-
sentially a carefully reasoned statement of the principles which led 
to the decision, serving not only to explain the basis of the decision 
but to afford a guide upon which future conduct may be patterned 
so as to conform to the Rule of Law, and to afford a precedent upon 
which future cases may be decided. But the opinion-writing staffs 
of agencies, as Mr. Hector has told us, explain that they consciously 
avoid statements of general principle as much as possible in the 
opinions they write, because they must be able to write an opinion 
justifying an opposite conclusion the next day, and hence must not 
be hampered by prior statements of general principles (p. 26). 
In short, the typical processes of administrative adjudication 
are fundamentally at odds with the tenets of the Rule of Law. It 
was Mr. Hector's conclusion (p. 30) that the administrative system 
does not produce consistent, informed, responsible, or articulate 
judgments-and that it is an ideal breeding ground for ex parte 
presentations and improper influence (p. 30). 
A Pathological Specimen 
I have undertaken to describe the attitudes which differentiate 
agencies from the courts, and the characteristics of administrative 
adjudication that create its unique problems. Now I should like 
to direct your attention to a pathological specimen that shows what 
can happen-indeed, what did happen-as a result of the attitudes 
and procedures I have undertaken to describe in general terms. 
Anna Myers was a widow, thirty-five years of age, with two 
children; and she was lonely. By some happy chance, she met 
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Charles Boyd, a widower, fifty-nine years old, who had six of his 
nine children living with him. They fell in love and were married. 
The bride took her two children with her to her husband's abode, 
but unfortunately the house was too small for the two families. 
The husband's children resented their father's new bride; and 
there was some trouble between the two sets of children. In the 
course of time, relations became so strained that the bride and 
groom decided the only way to attain peaceful and harmonious 
relationships was to maintain two houses. His children lived in 
one; hers in the other. Thus was connubial bliss restored; and 
during their two years and eight months of marriage, they were 
blessed with three children-twins born in April 1954, and a third 
child born posthumously in May 1955. The record established 
continuous cohabitation as man and wife. Indeed, his death-the 
event which gave rise to the case-occurred when he suffered a 
heart attack one night while in his wife's intimate embrace. 
The husband had been, in the parlance of the Social Security 
Administration, a fully-insured individual; and accordingly after 
his death Anna applied for the various benefits due under the law 
to a widow who had been living with a fully-insured husband at 
the time of his death. Her claim was denied on the grounds that 
she was not living with her husband at the time of his death. This 
somewhat startling conclusion was predicated on the theory that 
if husband and wife have separate abodes, they cannot be deemed 
to be living together. Evidence as to the reason for dividing the 
family between two houses-and indeed, evidence as to the cir-
cumstances of his death-was all irrelevant; such matters could 
not change established administrative policy. The policy, to be 
sure, had its genesis elsewhere than in the statute. The statute20 
provided in part that a widow shall be deemed to have been living 
with her husband if they were both members of the same house-
hold [it said nothing about sharing the same abode] or if he had 
been contributing to her support, or if he had been ordered to do 
so. To the reviewing courts, it appeared plain that Anna must be 
deemed to have been living with her husband, under the plain 
language of the statute as applied to the undisputed facts. But it 
was apparently the fixed policy of the agency that if husband and 
wife shared two residences, they could not be deemed to be mem-
bers of the same household. In short, the statutory test was 
whether husband and wife were living together; but the admin-
istrative test was whether they had only one house. Thus, it may 
26 64 Stat. c. 809, § 216 (h) (2) (1950). 
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be seen how the sweet freedom of administrative discretion can 
lead an agency to establish policies at odds with the legislative 
intent. 
Following the administrative denial of her claim, Anna re-
quested the hearing afforded her by statute. This was duly held, 
and the referee upheld the administrative denial of Anna's claim. 
With great tact, he made no reference to the most explicit testi-
mony adduced as to the occasion of the husband's demise, except 
to observe, "He died while visiting the claimant." 
Anna then applied for a review by the Appeals Council, the 
appellate body of the Bureau. The Council, however, refused to 
review the case-on the somewhat discomforting ground that "a 
review of the referee's decision would result in no advantage to 
the claimant." Here is a pointed illustration of the prejudgment 
that occurs when an agency sits as judge in its o,;vn cause. 
It might also be noted that the agency had a more direct interest 
in the case. It had already made certain payments to a child of 
decedent's previous marriage; and these payments would have to 
be characterized as an unauthorized disbursement if the widow's 
claim were upheld. She was, in effect, asking the agency to say it 
had decided wrong the first time. 
Fortunately, Anna had a lawyer-and a courageous one. Most 
claimants do not have the advantage of legal representation, for 
the agency's regulations27 prohibit an attorney from charging or 
receiving a fee in excess of ten dollars, except as otherwise specifi-
cally authorized. It is easy to understand why most la,;vyers do 
not eagerly accept for such a fee a case which involves study of a 
complex insurance statute of more than 100 pages, implemented 
by some 277 pages of regulations in fine print, and which may 
involve (as in Anna's case) filing the initial papers, appearing at a 
hearing which occupied the better part of a day, and then seeking 
an administrative appeal, and prosecuting it if it is allowed. Even 
if counsel is willing to do all this for ten dollars, he may under-
standably feel discouraged because of the circumstance that there 
are those who suspect that many policies of the Social Security Ad-
ministration are set forth in unpublished documents which the 
hearing examiners follow but which are unavailable to the parties 
or their counsel. 
But Anna's counsel exhausted all administrative remedies and 
pursued his case by petition for review to the federal district court. 
That tribunal denied a government motion for summary judgment 
27 20 C.F.R. § 403.713 (d) (2) (1949). 
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(:filed apparently for the reason that the agency did not want Anna 
to have a hearing, even in court, on the question whether she was 
living with her husband when in his intimate embrace on the 
night of his death) and entered an order reversing the decision of 
the Social Security Administration.28 
The Government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, charging in its brief that the decision of the district 
court "has over-ruled the long-established administrative under-
standing." (Brief, p. 14) But the appeal was unsuccessful, the 
court preferring to decide the case on the basis of the statutory 
language, rather than the administrative understanding.20 
While this sorry tale concerns an admittedly extreme case-one 
which can most kindly be described as pathological-yet it may 
serve to illustrate the problem that is raised by the conflict between 
administrative adjudication and the rule of law; and it may serve 
as a point of departure for discussing a few basic questions seeking 
to probe the reasons for this unfortunate conflict. 
The Reasons for the Trend Toward Administrative Adjudication 
Among the reasons advanced retrospectively to explain the 
phenomenal trend during the last three decades away from the 
Rule of Law and toward administrative adjudication, one of the 
most popular rationalizations is that the courts were not equal to 
the task-that there were too many cases for the courts to decide, 
and that the cases presented problems too difficult and technical 
for the judicial mind. 
But actually, I submit, this is not true at all. The courts could 
handle the cases being decided by administrative agencies. We 
might need more courts, of course, and more judges. But there 
never seems to be any great difficulty in :finding able lawyers willing 
to accept lifetime appointments as federal judges. Nor have the 
judges been incompetent to master the difficult problems involved. 
The Tax Court and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals pass 
on questions just as complex and technical as the questions passed 
on by the I.C.C. and S.E.C. In reality, the trend toward admin-
istrative adjudication reflects not a breakdown of the courts, but 
rather a breakdown of the legislative process. 
Most agencies have been created because Congress faced a 
situation where it was clear that some law was needed to prevent 
or correct potential social abuses, but where it was not at all clear 
28Boyd v. Folsom, 149 F. Supp. 925 (W.D. Pa. 1957). 
20 Boyd v. Folsom, 257 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1958). 
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what the law should be. Not having sufficient information about 
the problem to lay down a well formulated policy, Congress took 
the easy way out of the dilemma by creating an agency, and delegat-
ing to the agency responsibility for settling fundamental matters 
of policy, and implementing such policy by rules having the force 
of law. Such was the general situation which led to the creation 
of such agencies as the Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal 
Trade Commission, Securities Exchange Commission, Atomic 
Energy Commission, and many others that might be mentioned. 
Congress, of course, gave polite recognition to the legal principle 
that some standard must be created to limit the agency's policy-
making responsibilities, but the standards set up were so vague as 
to amount to little more than the expression of a pious hope that 
the agency would act in the public interest. 
It may, indeed, be necessary, upon venturing into a new field 
of governmental regulation, to grant the agency wide powers. 
Perhaps the agency must, initially, have some authority to experi-
ment. But as experience defines the contours of the problem in-
volved, opportunities are afforded to redefine and tighten the 
standards which guide administrative action, terminating the 
agency's authority to perpetuate unsuccessful experiments. Oc-
casionally the Congress has done this, as in the 1947 amendments 
to the National Labor Relations Act. But too often the Congress 
has permitted the original enactment to stand for generations with-
out significant amendment. The whole body of radio law, for 
example (or so I am told), is based upon a statute adopted in 1927, 
when the knowledge of the problems involved was very slight. 
Those of us who turned to the Communications Act last winter to 
see what guide it provided to solve the many problems by which 
the radio and television industry has recently been so bitterly 
plagued found that it provided no guide at all to most of the prob-
lems-because those problems had not been envisaged in 1927. 
If Congress had kept the act up to date through the years, the 
situation would have been much healthier. 
But the fact seems to be that Congress has lost much of its 
ability to legislate. Its capacity to produce legislation is no greater 
now than it was forty or fifty years ago. When we pause to think 
of all the streamlining which has been done in the courts during 
the past fifty years, does it not seem strange that Congress has done 
so little to modernize its mm procedures? 
It would seem that Congress is in dire need of a more efficient 
staff organization-a staff which could hear all affected groups, and 
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study the problems involved, and then submit to the appropriate 
congressional committee a carefully planned proposal for legisla-
tive solution of the problems that are now turned over-lock, stock, 
and barrel-to an administrative agency. Surely, if Congress can 
delegate such broad powers to an independent agency, it can 
delegate a comparable measure of power to its own staff organiza-
tions-and if the delegation were thus kept with Congress' own 
organization, there would be closer supervision and avoidance of 
some of the dangers that result from delegating the legislative func-
tion to an independent agency. 
When responsibility for formulating policy, through the twin 
measures of rulemaking and ad hoc administrative adjudication, 
is delegated to an organization so large that responsibility is divided 
among hundreds of persons, many of whom are politically moti-
vated, it is inevitable that there should result a tendency toward 
government by men, and not by law. 
This was well pointed out by that patron saint of all Republi-
can critics of administrative agencies, the late Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, who said in 1937: 
"There is a conflict of principle involved in their make-up 
and functions .... They are vested with duties of administra-
tion ... and at the same time they are given important judicial 
work .... The evils resulting from this confusion of principles 
are insidious and far-reaching .... Pressures and influences 
properly enough directed toward officers responsible for 
formulating and administering policy constitute an unwhole-
some atmosphere in which to adjudicate private rights. But 
the mixed duties of the commissions render escape from these 
subversive influences impossible. Furthermore, the same men 
are obliged to serve both as prosecutors and as judges. This 
not only undermines judicial fairness; it weakens public con-
fidence in that fairness. Commission decisions affecting pri-
vate rights and conduct lie under the suspicion of being 
rationalizations of the preliminary findings which the Com-
mission, in the role of prosecutor, presented to itself."30 
The Remedy 
I observed that people have been talking about administrative 
law since at least the time of Aristotle. It might be added that 
from time to time, through the years, they have done things about 
it. 
ao Quoted, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 206 (1941). 
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The Magna Carta was the result of the very effective protests 
by the barons gathered at Runnymede, who objected to the ad-
ministrative law of King John. The American Declaration of 
Independence charged many abuses against the administrative 
agencies comprising the British Government's colonial establish-
ment. Incidentally, many of the phrases employed in that docu-
ment by Thomas Jefferson have a surprisingly modern ring. It 
protested the "multitude of new offices" that had been created. 
It objected to the "swarms of officers" sent to "harass" the people. 
It bemoaned the fact that administrative officers were displacing 
the legislatures, and depriving the citizens of the benefits of fair 
trials in the courts. 
Perhaps our brief review this afternoon of the attitudes and 
procedures of administrative agencies suggests that the time has 
come once again for the people of this country to do something 
about applying the Rule of Law to the executive agencies of the 
Government. 
We must of course move with caution and circumspection. As 
Mr. Justice Stone warned in United Statesv. Morgan,31 we must not 
"repeat in this day the mistake made by the courts of law when 
equity was struggling for recognition as an ameliorating system of 
justice." 
What was the mistake to which Mr. Justice Stone referred? Was 
it not the mistake of attempting to continue an artificial separation 
of law and equity-a separation which is continuing to cause 
trouble even to this very day? If we are to avoid this mistake, must 
we not move along the path of integrating the functions of the 
agencies with those of Congress and of the courts? 
This, in brief, is the fundamental tenet of the recommenda-
tions of the second Hoover Commission, many of whose proposals 
(somewhat modified in form as a result of the work of the drafting 
committees of the American Bar Association) are now pending in 
Congress. They adopt four basic approaches to the problem. 
First: Reduce the area of untrammeled administrative discre-
tion by enacting legislative standards that will afford real guidance 
to the agencies in effectuating congressionally-approved policies. 
Second: Remove the aura of secrecy, which serves as a fertile 
breeding ground for improper influences. It can be removed by 
requiring the agencies to make public their criteria of decision, 
and by providing for public participation in rulemaking proce-
81 307 U .s. 183, 191 (1939). 
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dures, and by providing means whereby such participation would 
be effective. 
Third: Guarantee fairness of procedure by providing for due 
separation of functions within the agencies, and by adopting meas-
ures designed to assure that decision shall be based on matters of 
record and not on ex parte conferences, and to assure that all the 
matters considered in reaching the decision shall be known to all 
parties. 
Fourth: Achieve a justicialization of the decision-making proc-
ess. This approach has several facets. It contemplates that the 
hearing officers would be made, in effect, trial judges. They would 
decide the case at the conclusion of the hearing, and on the basis 
of the matters adduced at the hearing. Their decision would stand 
as the decision of the agency, subject to appeal on certain basic 
issues (such as questions of law) directly to the heads of the agency, 
who would be able to consider the appealed cases in the same 
manner as appellate judges consider appealed cases, and to write 
Garefully reasoned opinions disposing of the key issues thus 
presented. For many agencies, this simple remedy would cure 
most of the evils of institutional decision. But in others-the 
Federal Trade Commission and the National Labor Relations Board 
come to mind as two illustrative instances-it would seem helpful 
to follow the example afforded by the Tax Court, and to separate 
the prosecuting and policy-making functions from the judicial 
function, vesting the latter in a separate court. 
Conclusion 
I have made bold to suggest that administrative agencies have 
strayed from the political theories and judicial norms that con-
stitute our American Rule of Law-one of the most precious of our 
American heritages. But I do not view the departure as in any 
way a planned subversive attempt to overthrow our philosophical 
ideals of government. Rather, I think, the departure has been 
almost accidental-a result of a lack of careful planning and super-
vision. When the procedural difficulties I have described have 
been corrected, a healthy change of attitude will follow. The 
present condition of the patient may be grave, but the prognosis 
is favorable. 
